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Abstract
Credit reporting systems are an important ingredient for ﬁnancial markets. These systems
are based upon the unique identiﬁcation of borrowers, which is enabled if a compulsory iden-
tiﬁcation system exists in a country. We present evidence derived from diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence
analyses on the impact of the interplay of credit reporting and identiﬁcation systems on ﬁ-
nancial access and intermediation in 172 countries during years of 2000 to 2008. Our results
suggest that the introduction of an identiﬁcation system has a positive eﬀect on ﬁnancial inter-
mediation (bank credit to deposits) and ﬁnancial access (private credit to GDP), especially in
countries where there is also a credit reporting system. This eﬀect exists net of other country
characteristics.
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Credit reporting, the collection and distribution of ﬁnancial information on customers, is an im-
portant ingredient in ﬁnancial markets. Although by now a lot is known on their impact on access
to ﬁnance, little is known about the interplay of credit reporting and critical infrastructure such
as a national identiﬁcation system, which requires issuance of picture-bearing ID cards/numbers
to natural persons. Customer identiﬁcation, however, is needed before a borrower can be reported
to a credit reporting agency and this is regulated by legislation.
With the rise of Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT)
laws after September 11, 2001, requirements for customer identiﬁcation in the ﬁnancial sector have
become more restrictive. Since its inception in 1989, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an
inter-governmental body at the OECD, has issued 40+9 Recommendations designed to counter the
use of ﬁnancial systems by criminals for money laundering and terrorism ﬁnancing. These guidelines
are implemented in industrialized and developing countries. For example, in Recommendation No.
5, FATF demands that ﬁnancial institutions must conduct Customer Due Diligence (CDD) when
establishing business relations with either natural or legal persons. It is required that ﬁnancial
institutions verify a customer’s identity based upon reliable documents, data, or information from
independent sources, such as the government (this is known as Know-Your-Customer or KYC).
The introduction of a mandatory national identiﬁcation system for the general public and
the distribution of unique ID numbers and cards should facilitate identiﬁcation procedures and
thereby positively contribute to credit reporting and ﬁnancial access. Moreover, it reduces the
costs of account opening by reducing paper-work. This enables monitoring, screening and risk
assessment in banks, which are better able to identify agglomerated risk exposure to borrowers
with a unique identity. However, there is little research on the impact of identiﬁcation systems on
ﬁnancial access and intermediation in an economy as well as its interplay with credit reporting.
We present a new panel data set which compiles information on the introduction of compulsory
identiﬁcation systems, credit reporting and ﬁnancial intermediation and access in 172 countries
between 2000 and 2008. We analyze the interplay by using diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analyses (DID),
while controlling for important factors which also have an impact such as property rights, rule of law
and ﬁnancial freedom. The data is derived from diﬀerent sources, among them World Bank (Doing
Business), International Labor Organization, Heritage Foundation, and Privacy International as
well as the U.S. State Department.
Our hypothesis is that the introduction of identiﬁcation systems has a positive eﬀect on ﬁnancial
access and intermediation. The basic assumption is that identiﬁcation procedures at ﬁnancial
institutions are less cumbersome and less prone to fraud, if identity cards (with a unique identity
number) are used, which in turn enables credit reporting, facilitates access to ﬁnancial services,
and therefore makes ﬁnancial intermediation more eﬃcient.
Our preliminary results suggest slightly positive eﬀects of the introduction of national identiﬁ-
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systems exist. However, these preliminary results seem to be more pronounced in OECD countries
compared to developing countries and require further investigation in future.
We intensively check the robustness of our results, because of potential serial correlation in
errors terms, small size of the treatment group, and/or potentially inappropriate control groups.
These problems can lead to inaccurate DID estimates. We ﬁrst use a method developed by Bertrand
et al. (2004) and back these results up using a method developed by Conley and Taber (2009),
in order to control for the small size of our treatment group. Finally we produce country-level
evidence for a limited number of treated countries relying on a method developed by Abadie et
al. (2009) in order to create proper control groups. Because of data limitations in the pre-/post-
intervention period, this analysis was only possible for nine countries: Chad, Cyprus, El Salvador,
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Oman, Portugal, Romania, and the United Arab Emirates.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses recent research on
identiﬁcation and access to ﬁnance, and section 3 presents the international regulations on ﬁnancial
integrity. Section 4 provides a description of the data used in the analyses, and summary statistics;
section 5 presents the econometric framework and interpretation of the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Discussion
In banking, it is necessary to determine a customer’s identity in order to be able to conduct
business, monitor transactions and to assign them to speciﬁc persons. Identiﬁcation creates legal
liability and it is a precondition for risk mitigation procedures such as screening and monitoring as
well as reputation systems like credit reporting. In fact, the introduction of identiﬁcation systems
is likely to have two eﬀects on ﬁnancial intermediation, a direct and an indirect one. The ﬁrst
eﬀect is that there exists a direct positive impact on access to bank services, including credit,
enabled through unambiguous identiﬁcation of natural persons. The second eﬀect is that there
exists an indirect impact through credit reporting systems, which in turn lead to more eﬃcient
ﬁnancial intermediation. These systems are based upon unambiguous borrower identiﬁcation. If
unambiguous identiﬁcation exists, data from diﬀerent sources can be matched more reliably and
assigned to a unique individual.
2.1 Identiﬁcation, Monitoring and Reputation
Identiﬁcation is a precondition for mechanisms that reduce information asymmetries in banking
and decrease enforcement risk inherent in contracts. It is typically taken for granted in the eco-
nomics literature. For example, screening and monitoring plays a critical role in the ﬁnance and
banking literature, where diﬀerent authors suggest that banks use devices such as collateral or
loan size for inferences about credit risk (Bester (1985)). In Dell’Ariccia (2000), a model is pro-
3
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 031posed, where banks compete on screening standards for applicant borrowers, who prefer not to
be screened. In Gehrig (1998) banks can use creditworthiness tests to generate (imperfect) risk
information about borrowers. The author discusses conditions under which screening eﬀorts are
reduced by competition and when overall loan portfolio quality may decline due to a lower quality
of information produced by banks. We argue that unambiguous identiﬁcation of customers enables
risk assessment by banks and improves the screening abilities. Therefore, it also has an impact on
credit reporting and needs to be analyzed together with it.
Jappelli and Pagano (1993) show that credit reporting is positively associated with increases
in loan demand, borrower mobility, and a decrease of operational costs of credit registers. In
Jappelli and Pagano (2000), bank lending increases with information sharing, whereas credit risk
decreases. Identiﬁcation should have a positive inﬂuence on credit reporting systems and these, in
turn, contribute positively to ﬁnancial sector development.
Related to our work are also theoretical works on ambiguous identiﬁcation and associated
problems such as identity theft. For instance, Kahn and Roberds (2008) propose a search model
with imperfect identiﬁcation of borrowers. Such imperfect identiﬁcation leads to fraud risk, where
debts can potentially not be enforced, because the identity of the borrower cannot be ascertained.
This diﬀers from credit risk. The authors’ focus is on technical identiﬁcation, where identity is
described as a list of attributes or vectors of zeros and ones uniquely attributable to individuals. In
their model, diﬀerent types of identity thefts occur in the equilibrium and these incidences represent
the trade-oﬀ between costly monitoring and the control of fraud. The economics of identity theft
is also discussed in the Journal of Economic Perspectives (Anderson et al. (2008)).
2.2 Access to Finance and Identity Documentation
The literature on access to ﬁnance also increasingly focuses on documentation requirements. For
example, Beck et al. (2008) analyze barriers such as geography, aﬀordability, eligibility and its
impact on the ratio of private credit to GDP and ﬁnancial services penetration. The latter is
measured as the percentage of adults with access to a ﬁnancial institution. They present data
collected from 209 banks in 62 countries. The number of documents needed to open an account is
negatively associated with penetration and private credit to GDP. Our approach diﬀers from this
research, because we analyze the eﬀects of the introduction of a national identiﬁcation system on
ﬁnancial access over time, taking into account also credit reporting.
The results of Beck et al. (2008) are included in World Bank (2008), where it is stated that
"Financial institutions usually require one or more documents for identiﬁcation purposes, but
in many low-income countries, most people-especially those not employed in the formal sector
(who are usually poor)-lack such papers." For example, banks in industrialized countries such as
the Czech Republic, Spain, and Sweden demand on average only one document to open a bank
account. This contrasts with banks in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sierra Leone, which require at
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does not carry all the information needed to open a bank account. Some developing countries,
such as Malawi, Uganda and Tanzania have no identiﬁcation system altogether. Closely related
to our paper is World Bank (2009), which ﬁnds that burdensome documentary requirements lead
to a lower density of accounts in ﬁnancial institutions, where one additional document required
results in 153 fewer accounts per 1,000 persons. Controls used in that analysis are GDP per
capita, population, and population density. Burdensome documentation is needed if other means
of identiﬁcation (such as identity cards) either do not exist or are easy to forge, which reduces their
value for veriﬁcation purposes. There is also interesting country-level evidence: Giné et al. (2009)
discuss the impact of identiﬁcation on borrower repayment as identiﬁcation increases a lender’s
ability to sanction borrowers. The authors conducted a randomized ﬁeld experiment in Malawi to
examine the impact of ﬁngerprinting on borrowers in rural areas, where no unique identiﬁcation
system exists. They show that ﬁngerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates for farmers
with the highest ex-ante default risk, whereas it had no eﬀect for the rest of farmers. The authors
state that one of the reasons for the change in repayment rates were reductions in adverse selection
(smaller loan sizes) and lower moral hazard. In Bertrand et al. (2007), the authors study the
allocation of driver’s licenses in India. They discuss the extra payments that have to be made to
agents in order to speed up the procedure of issuance, a kind of indirect corruption. The authors
present evidence from a survey, where participants stated that agent use was prevalent in India also
for other government services. For example, of 155 participants 54% who got a ration card stated
that they used agents, 47% of those obtaining land titles used them, 15% of those getting a passport
and 20% of those who obtained a bank account. Driver’s licenses, ration cards as well as passports
are used by Indian banks for identiﬁcation purposes. India is introducing an identiﬁcation system.1
Determinants for ﬁnancial sector depth and outreach, which are also important for our research
are discussed in Beck et al. (2008), Beck et al. (2007) and Djankov et al. (2007) all of whom
survey cross-country determinants of private credit to GDP. From this literature, we derive other
factors to be included in our econometric analysis and which are identiﬁed as standard drivers. In
Djankov et al. (2007), for example, creditor rights as well as public and private credit registers are
included in the analysis. We control for these factors when analyzing the eﬀects of the introduction
of identiﬁcation systems. Credit reporting enables the building of reputation among borrowers,
where ﬁnancial data from diﬀerent sources are merged to create credit reports. Unique identiﬁcation
numbers improve the eﬃciency of matching procedures in these data bases.
From this review, we conclude that there is currently no survey either internationally or in a
given country of the interplay of the introduction of a national ID system with credit reporting
and ﬁnancial access and intermediation. Furthermore, whereas there is an extensive literature on
1BBC News, India to launch ’ID card’ scheme, Page last updated at 15:45 GMT, Thursday, 25 June 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/8119070.stm
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devote attention to problems arising from imperfect identiﬁcation of clients.
3 International Guidelines on Financial Integrity
There are international guidelines on how ﬁnancial institutions must identify costumers before
establishing a business relationship with them. The leading bodies setting the standards on Cus-
tomer Due Diligence (CDD) are the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)
associated with the OECD and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, which is part of the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS). FATF has published guidelines which are known as the
40+9 Recommendations (Financial Action Task Force (2004)) - a compilation of standards on the
prevention and criminalization of money laundering. The 9 Special Recommendations are aimed
at preventing terrorist ﬁnancing. Although these are not binding, countries not following the 40+9
Recommendations risk being put on the list of Non-cooperative Countries and Territories. This
can negatively impinge on international ﬁnancial ﬂows and investment to the listed countries.
As of August 2010, FATF had 36 member countries and eight FATF Associate Members, which
are the FATF-style Regional Bodies (FSRBs).2 The OECD countries are a member of FATF,
whereas developing countries are mostly organized in the various regional bodies. A country can
be a member of FATF, but also of a FATF-style Regional Body. In Table (1) the membership of
each country is reported.
INSERT Table (1) here.
Due diligence requirements for ﬁnancial institutions are set out in Recommendations No. 5 to
12 of the 40+9 Recommendations of FATF (Financial Action Task Force 2004). These require-
ments encompass several aspects. While ﬁnancial institutions have some discretionary freedom in
designing procedural policies, there ought to be: (i) a (tiered) customer acceptance policy; (ii) cus-
tomer identiﬁcation mechanisms; (iii) on-going monitoring of activities; and (iv) risk management
procedures. In Recommendation No. 5 ﬁnancial institutions are obliged to verify a customer’s
identity using reliable documents, data, and information from an ‘independent source.’3
Banking relationships should not be established until the identity of the new customer is ‘sat-
isfactorily veriﬁed.’ Documents satisfying this standard are ‘those most diﬃcult to obtain illicitly
and to counterfeit,’ such as government-issued IDs. In addition, information regarding the nature
of the business relationship must be obtained.
2These are: Asia/Paciﬁc Group on Money Laundering, Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, Eurasian Group,
Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the
Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism, FATF on Money Laundering in
South America, Inter Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa, and the Middle East
and North Africa Financial Action Task Force.
3Essentially this refers to documents issued by the government.
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The quality, coverage, and technological level of identiﬁcation systems diﬀers enormously around
the world. In the following, we give some selected examples of the variety associated with identiﬁca-
tion systems in large developing countries. For example, in Bangladesh and Pakistan new biometric
cards are issued to the population whereas in other countries, such as Cameroon, old ID cards are
paper-based and new ID cards are introduced only slowly. In Indonesia regional authorities are in
charge of issuing the cards and if individuals move from one region to another, they might obtain
and hold several ID cards.4 It is also worth noting that the backbone of a identiﬁcation system is
the population register. Such registers are used to register births and deaths, marriages or changes
of names. A civil register provides information on who lives in the country and where they live.
They are widely used in conjunction with the issuance of identity cards (Oﬃce of National Statis-
tics 2005). In many developing countries, registries are incomplete and of poor quality, a problem
that is discussed elsewhere (Mahapatra et al. (2007)). Data on birth registration rates, which we
could have used for approximation of coverage of the population with ID cards, is also not available
for several years.
A number of large developing countries are currently on the verge of introducing or are planning
to introduce new ID cards, among them India (Whitley and Hosein (2010)) and Bangladesh.
Another challenge associated with introduction of ID systems are the costs, which are rather
high. There were heated debates in the U.S. as well as Great Britain about the introduction of
national identity cards. The British Home Oﬃce estimated the average cost at 85 million pounds
(96 million euros) per year over the ﬁrst ten years after the introduction of an identiﬁcation system
in the UK. An additional 50 million pounds (57 million Euros) per year would also be necessary
over the same time period for veriﬁcation services.5 The plans to introduce an identity card were
stopped in 2010 by the new British government. According to the LSE Identity Project, there
appear to be some signiﬁcant potential beneﬁts to the UK in adopting a harmonized system of
identiﬁcation. Among the many, beneﬁts "could possibly be connected to ﬁnancial control and
money laundering regulations to provide a means by which the ID system can be used for a much
wider range of purposes. This could include operating a bank account, using professional services
such as a solicitor or accountant, applying for a permit or license, internal travel, buying property,
stocks or shares, applying for credit or using large amounts of cash." However, the LSE Report
concludes that these beneﬁts might be limited since the current proposal, because of its size and
complexity, miss key opportunities to establish a secure and cost-eﬀective identify system.6
4A Single Identity Number (Nomor Induk Kependudukan) was introduced by the Administration of People Act
in Indonesia. As of 2010, it is illegal to hold multiple identity cards.
5Home Oﬃce: Identity Card Bill—Regulatory Impact Assessment, [url]www.homeoffice.gov.uk/ (March 2010)
6 http://identityproject.lse.ac.uk
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Around the world, diﬀerent types of identiﬁcation systems evolved, leading to diﬀering practices
by ﬁnancial institutions to identify customers. In the next subsections, we summarize statistics
on national identiﬁcation systems from our international sample and provide a description of the
variables used in our analysis. The main advantage of our data set is its cross-sectional time series
character with respect to ﬁnancial variables and national identiﬁcation systems, which allow us to
perform various diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analyses. The data for identiﬁcation systems comes from
our own compilation (described below), with the other variables sourced from the World Bank
(Doing Business), the International Labor Organization, International Telecommunication Union,
and the Heritage Foundation. Table (2) presents the variables used in our econometric analysis.
We ﬁrst describe the ﬁnancial and economic variables and then present some evidence on the
international landscape of identiﬁcation systems.
INSERT Table (2) here.
4.1 Data and Summary Statistics
Our main interest is how the introduction of a compulsory identiﬁcation system impacts ﬁnancial
intermediation and access and how it interplays with credit reporting. To measure ﬁnancial in-
termediation we use the variable bank credit to deposits. This ratio is a proxy of intermediation
eﬃciency and gauges the extent to which banks intermediate society’s savings into private sec-
tor credit: the higher the loan-deposit ratio, the higher the intermediation eﬃciency (Beck and
Demirgüc-Kunt (2009)). "Access to ﬁnance", however, is more diﬃcult to deﬁne and measure as
it involves multiple dimensions. Broadly, access to ﬁnancial services - ﬁnancial inclusion - implies
an absence of price/non-price barriers for the use of the formal ﬁnancial system. As banks are the
gateway to most basic ﬁnancial services we consider ﬁnancial access as analogous to banking inclu-
sion/exclusion. However, we acknowledge that in developing countries, the informal sector might
play an important role in providing ﬁnancial services. Unfortunately, there are no time-series data
on informal sector development, except for a handful of countries in FinScope data.
Honohan (2008) presents a ﬁnancial access indicator that is a composite measure of the percent-
age of adults with access to some account in a ﬁnancial or micro-ﬁnance institution. This variable
is only available for one year. Christen et al. (2004) and CGAP (2009) also collect data on accounts
maintained in ﬁnancial and micro-ﬁnance institutions to measure such access. The problem with
these data sources is that they do not exist for several years in a row. Due to the lack of consistent
cross-country micro-data on usage of ﬁnancial services we rely on credit to the private sector to
measure access to ﬁnance. In general, this indicator is a measure of ﬁnancial depth and not always
a perfect proxy of access to ﬁnance, although exhibits a positive, but imperfect, correlation (see
World Bank 2007). However, this concern will be properly taken into account when interpreting
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available on the importance of diﬀerent barriers of access to ﬁnance. However, using a bank level
survey in 80 countries, Beck et al. (2007) shed some light on the drivers of cross-country diﬀerences
in ﬁnancial access and use. Indicators of access barriers - aﬀordability, geographical access, and
eligibility - are in fact negatively correlated with actual use of ﬁnancial services, conﬁrming that
these barriers can exclude individuals from using bank services.
To take into account barriers of aﬀordability we introduce in our regressions Gross National
Income per capita, which is of course only an indirect measure for aﬀordability. Costs of accessing
the services is in some countries at least 50% per cent of per capita GDP, but unfortunately these
data are just available for one year and cannot be used in our analysis.
To measure diﬀerent levels of technological development and to proxy of geographical barriers,
we introduce the number of ﬁxed-line telephones as a regressor. In fact, although an ideal measure
would indicate the density of branches per square kilometer, the number of ﬁxed lines provides an
initial, albeit crude indicator for two reasons. First, as some ﬁnancial institutions allow clients to
access services over the phone or via the Internet, greater coverage captures easier technological
access to bank services. As reported in World Bank (2008); Beck et al. (2008), a focus on branches
and ATMs ignores other, increasingly important, delivery channels. At the same time, this measure,
which is highly correlated with mobile and internet subscribers provided by World Bank, can
approximate technological advances that ultimately reduce banking costs.
An important aspect in our analysis is the existence of credit registries, which are also associated
with lower access barriers. We consider whether a public or private credit register is operating in
the country, along with the proportion of population covered by these registers. Due to the limited
series of this data, the sample size is inevitably reduced when we introduce credit register coverage
into the model.
We also know that creditor rights could play a potential role (Djankov et al. (2007); La Porta
et al. (1998)). To account for heterogeneity among country credit markets induced by origin of
commercial law, we introduce a country’s legal origin when constructing appropriate control groups.
Finally, the macroeconomic variables account for other market features, such as market size
(population) and monetary stability (inﬂation) that might inﬂuence the development of the banking
system. In order to capture a country’s institutional environment, we additionally include an
index of economic freedom from the Heritage Foundation. It is composed of ten scored economic
freedoms, among them freedom from corruption, ﬁnancial freedom and property rights protection.
We choose to rely on this indicator since it is available for the all years of the analysis, and it is
highly correlated with other important indexes already identiﬁed in the literature (e.g. 0.80 with
rule of law index from World Resources Institute).
Lastly, one of the innovations presented in this paper is our panel data set on the existence
of mandatory and voluntary identiﬁcation systems for the 172 countries included in our survey.
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United Nations. If we could not verify the existence of an identiﬁcation system or its type, we
asked the embassies of the respective countries for advice. Altogether, we surveyed the existence
and type of identiﬁcation systems for 172 countries in the time period of 2000-2008, a time frame
for which we could ﬁnd veriﬁable information. Table (3) and Table (4) present pooled summary
statistics and correlation of the main variables used in the econometric analysis.
INSERT Table (3) here.
INSERT Table (4) here.
A number of variables cannot be introduced into the analysis. For example, there are no
internationally comparable data on identity theft or fraud in bank services. Therefore, we cannot
analyze the interplay of mandatory identiﬁcation systems with these factors. In addition, there are
no time series on the costs of bank services, eligibility requirements or the number of accounts in
ﬁnancial institutions. Unfortunately, there is also no data on the number and types of identiﬁcation
cards and passports issued to the population, let alone how much the introduction of such systems
cost, apart from anecdotal evidence. These questions must be left for further research.
4.2 International Evidence on Identiﬁcation Systems
We identiﬁed three groups of countries in our sample. The ﬁrst group comprises 97 countries
that have a compulsory national identiﬁcation system, where the population is required to hold
an identity card from a speciﬁc age on. The second group, which represents our treated sample,
comprises of 17 countries that introduced a compulsory identiﬁcation system between 2000 and
2008 (see Table (5)). Finally, in 58 countries, which comprises our (restricted) pool of control
countries, no compulsory ID system exists.
INSERT Table (5) here.
However, these countries might have a voluntary ID card system, where the population can
apply for an identity card, if needed. In some countries substitutes are used, such as passports,
driver’s licenses, or other government-issued documents. In developing countries, personal docu-
ments might not be available to the general population, especially not to the poor. As a substitute
salary slips and reference letters are used as proof of domicile and for identiﬁcation (Beck et al.
(2008)). Note that in the U.S., there is no identiﬁcation system as deﬁned in our study. In the U.S.,
no identiﬁcation cards are issued to the population which bears a unique number as well as a photo
of the individual. While Social Security Numbers are used as substitutes they are not comparable
to photo-bearing mandatory ID cards. In addition, some banks may require more documents in
order to open a bank account. This is also the case for the U.S., were apart from the SSN card, a
picture-bearing ID needs to be presented.7 In the last section of the paper, where we discuss the
7For example, Citibank writes online that one needs a U.S. address, SSN, and a driverâs license or state-issued ID
(https://online.citibank.com/US/JRS/pands/detail.do?ID=AOProductSelection). An international overview of
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Tests for the mean, computed for each year (not reported), suggest that there are no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the share of private credit to GDP between the treated group and those countries
that never introduced an ID-system. However, there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the share of bank
credit to deposits. Concerning credit reporting systems, signiﬁcant diﬀerences exist across the
three groups, when looking at public registers, both in term of existence and coverage; whereas
there is less diﬀerence when looking at private registers, especially in terms of coverage.
The existence of an identiﬁcation system does not automatically indicate the legal origin of a
country. Table (5) shows that many countries with English legal origin never introduced an ID
system, whereas there are much more countries of French and Socialist legal origin that introduced
such systems. This feature is taken into account in the matching procedure of Abadie et al. (2007)
where we use this variable to construct an appropriate control group.
Above we claim that the introduction of a national identiﬁcation system should lead to more
secure and eﬃcient identiﬁcation, by requiring just one document for identity veriﬁcation, in com-
parison to the requirement of bringing several documents for identity and address veriﬁcation. This
intuition is conﬁrmed by the negative correlation existing between the existence of a compulsory
identiﬁcation system and the number of documents required to open a bank checking account (-
0.28, signiﬁcant at 5% level) as well as the number of documents required to open a saving account
(-0.22, although not signiﬁcant). Unfortunately, this information from the World Bank is only
available for 2007 and not the entire survey period.
5 Econometric Models
In this section, we study the eﬀects of the introduction of a mandatory identiﬁcation system
on ﬁnancial access and intermediation relying on a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis (DID). The
evaluation of the eﬀect of a binary treatment (or program) is an intensively studied problem (see
for a review, Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)). To check the robustness of our results, we account
for three main problems associated with applying a standard DID analysis to a data set like ours:
positive serial correlation in error terms; asymmetric sizes of control and treatment group (with the
latter being small); and selection of appropriate control groups. In all these cases, standard DID
estimates and associated standard errors may lead to wrong conclusions about the signiﬁcance levels
of the treatment eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, in the following, we ﬁrst apply the methodology suggested
by Bertrand et al. (2004), henceforth abbreviated with BDM, we then back up our results using
a method developed by Conley and Taber (2009) and by Abadie et al. (2009), henceforth ADH,
for diﬀerent country cases. Unfortunately, in a number of countries, a mandatory identiﬁcation
system was either introduced at the beginning of our period of investigation (2000-2001) or at the
number/types of documents needed is presented by CGAP (http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.38735/FA2009.
pdf)
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only nine countries for which we could apply the estimator derived from Abadie et al. (2007),
further explained below. Depending on the control varablies we rely on, we have a minimum of
412 (related to the 2004-2008 period) observations and a maximum of 1263 observations (related
to all periods).
5.1 Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Analysis
A lot of attention in the literature is devoted to the concern that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
standard errors for the DID estimator may not be accurate in the presence of correlation between
outcomes within groups and between time periods (Bertrand et al. (2004); Wooldridge (2006);
Donald and Lang (2007)). This is especially present in cross-country analyses where the regressor
of interest (the dummy variable for the treatment) does not vary within clusters (i.e. countries).
BDM were concerned with multiple groups and time periods, where there may be correlation in
the group/time component errors leading to a multi-period version of the Moulton problem where
the failure to account for the presence of common group errors generates biased standard errors.
The authors show that ignoring this autocorrelation can have eﬀects on the properties of standard
procedure such as OLS and may lead researchers to erroneously conclude that there are eﬀects of
policy changes, where there are not. Assume S +1 time periods (T), and K +1 countries (G), and
let I be the policy variable (that is, a dummy equal to one after the introduction of an ID-system).




βs ∗ 1{Ti = s} +
K X
g=0
γg ∗ 1{Gi = g} + δ1 ∗ Ii +  (1)
where the coeﬃcient δ is the treatment parameter (DID) and Yit is our variable of interest (i.e.
alternatively bank credit to deposit and private credit to GDP).
The error structure BDM suggest is
 = ηGi,Ti + vi (2)
allowing for an individual error term vi, and a group/time speciﬁc component ηgt. The simpler
method suggested by BDM is to ignore time-series information, when computing standard errors.
We ﬁrst regress Yit on country ﬁxed-eﬀects, year dummies, and other covariates. We then divide
the residuals of the treated countries into two groups: average residuals from years before the
introduction of an ID-system, and average residuals from years after the introduction of an ID-
system. The estimate of the ID-system eﬀect is obtained from an OLS regression in this panel of
length of two (before and after). Results suggest a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the introduction
of a compulsory identiﬁcation system on ﬁnancial intermediation (bank credit over deposit) as well
12
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 031as on the share of access measured as private credit over GDP (see Table (6)). Standard DID
analysis (not reported), on the other hand, suggest a positive eﬀect only on bank credit to deposit.
INSERT Table (6) here.
In particular, and consistent with previous studies, these analyses conﬁrm a positive and signif-
icant eﬀect of credit reporting systems. Speciﬁcally, private register dummy and private coverage
are positive and highly signiﬁcant. Evidence for public registers is less strong, but it should be
noted that it is diﬃcult to properly estimate the eﬀect of slowly changing variables in ﬁxed-eﬀect
regressions (Plumper and Troeger (2007)).
However, overall these results suggest synergies between the introduction of a national compul-
sory identiﬁcation system and credit registers as outlined above. In fact, the treatment eﬀect (i.e.
introduction of an ID sytstem) is more signiﬁcant whenever we introduce the full set of variables
accounting for credit reporting among the regressors, which in most cases are jointly signiﬁcant. In
addition, comparisons in column (a) with the size of estimates in column (b) suggest that countries
with a credit register and identiﬁcation system tend to have higher levels of ﬁnancial interme-
diation and share of private credit to GDP. The coeﬃcient on the treatment variable is in fact
smaller, indicating a positive correlation between the two systems. The change in the sign of the
public register dummy is instead due to its negative correlation with the variable accounting for
private coverage. As stated above, therefore, the existence of compulsory identiﬁcation systems
may facilitate ﬁle matching from diﬀerent sources in order to unambiguously identify to one single
borrower. Importantly, these positive eﬀects are net of other constant country characteristics (e.g.
legal origin), which are captured by country-ﬁxed eﬀects, and country institutional environment,
which is measured by the economic freedom index (Overall score). Finally, we checked that these
results are not driven by country sample selection from (a) to (b). To summarize, these prelimi-
nary regressions suggest a slightly positive eﬀect of the introduction of a compulsory identiﬁcation
system, especially in countries where there are credit registers.
5.2 Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence with a Small Number of Treated Countries
Conley and Taber (2009) presents a new method of inference for DID estimators in circumstances
where only a small number of groups provide information about treatment parameters of interest,
that is the number of treated groups is smaller compared to the number of control groups (i.e.
countries that do not change their policy). This method is particularly suited for our data, where a
small number of countries (that is 17) introduced an identiﬁcation system during the period under
study (see again Table (5)).
The Conley and Taber (2009) approach is based on the hypothesis that the distribution of
the error term, which aﬀects inference of the parameter of interest, is the same for treated and
control groups. In order to have a common distribution of error terms for treatment and control
groups, a suﬃcient condition is random assignment of treatment conditional on group and time
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used to learn about the limiting distribution of the error in the treatment group, and to construct
conﬁdence intervals for the treatment-eﬀect parameter using the related empirical distribution. For
example, a 95% acceptance region could be estimated as [δlower,δupper]with these bounds being
the 2.5th and 97.5th of this empirical distribution under the null hypothesis (i.e. the eﬀect of
treatment is equal to zero). The null hypothesis that the treatment parameter is zero can then be
rejected when it is unlikely according to this distribution. This method can be used when classical
model does not apply (e.g. due to non-Normal or serially correlated errors), and accommodate
many forms of cross-sectional dependence and heteroskedasticity.
We identify 117 countries that did not change status during the period under investigation
and for which it is possible to collect the variables of interest. Table (7) reports 95% conﬁdence
intervals for the treatment parameter based on 3000 simulations. We also computed conﬁdence
intervals (not reported) only relying on countries that never introduced a compulsory ID-system
(with and without time dummies). In both cases results conﬁrm a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect by
the introduction of an identiﬁcation system on ﬁnancial intermediation (bank credit over deposits)
and private credit to GDP in the speciﬁcation accounting for credit registers coverage.
INSERT Table (7) here.
5.3 Synthethic Controls Groups: Country Evidence
Abadie et al. (2007) develop a method for constructing a synthetic control group from multiple
non-exposed groups, relying on a data-driven procedure. The idea behind the synthetic control
group approach is to construct the control as weighted average of the available control units, and
that it is a generalization of the usual DID analysis. Assuming that country 1 is exposed to the
intervention at time t the parameter of interest (the treatment eﬀect parameter δ) can be obtained
as








jYjt is an estimator for the outcome that would be observed in country 1 after t
in the absence of intervention, Yjt are the outcomes for j control groups, and w∗
j are the associated
weights. The main advantage of this estimator is to allow the presence of unobserved confounders
to vary across time (whereas it is assumed to be constant in traditional DID) while making explicit
the relative contribution of each control unit to the counterfactual. In Figure (1), we report the
synthetic control groups using the bank credit to deposits variable and for the treated countries
where it is possible to perform such an analysis, namely Chad, Cyprus, El Salvador, Lithuania, the
Netherlands, Oman, Portugal, Romania, and the United Arab Emirates. We focus on this variable
as it presents robust evidence across diﬀerent approaches. Below we discuss results for the private
credit to GDP as well. For all other treated countries it is not possible to perform this analysis as
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period.
INSERT Figure (1) here.




jYjt) as a weighted average of the outcomes of potential comparison countries,
where the weights are chosen relying on the same variables used in previous analyses so that the
pre-treatment outcome and the covariates of the synthetic control are, on average, very similar. In
order to construct a better synthetic control, we additionally introduce country legal origin among
the covariates, which was left out in previous regressions as it is a time-invariant variable. There-
fore, each country has its own synthetic control, which is unique and comprises diﬀerent countries
from the worldwide pool of control countries according to the matching procedure (weights and
country lists of synthetic control groups are available upon request).
Results mainly suggest a positive eﬀect for countries in the upper to high income class such as
the Netherlands, while such an eﬀect cannot be observed for developing countries like Chad. These
results are consistent with DID analyses, which distinguish the eﬀect for the low-income group (i.e.
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences). We do not report these estimations as the sample size does
not always allow the estimation of the coeﬃcient of interest when using credit register coverage
among the regressors, as this variable is available for a shorter period of time. However, these
results tentatively suggest a positive eﬀect for high-income group of countries, and a negative for
the low-income group. The latter result merits further investigation and could be due to several
factors, including the weak enforcement of KYC, the limited and slow distribution of new identity
cards, a large informal sector in the country, or aﬀordability of banking services, something we
could only indirectly account for.
The main limitation of the ADH estimator is that it does not allow us to assess the signiﬁcance
of the results using standard (large-sample) inferential techniques, as the number of units in the
control pool and the number of periods covered by the sample are quite small (see also Conley and
Taber 2009). However, placebo experiments can be implemented to draw inference, which consist
in applying the ADH estimator to control countries as if they introduced an identiﬁcation system
in order to assess whether the estimated eﬀect for the treated country is large relative to the eﬀect
for a country chosen at random. That is, in each iteration, we randomly assign the date of the
introduction of a compulsory ID system to one of the countries in the restricted control group, one
that never introduced an ID-system. If the estimated eﬀect in the treated country is larger than in
most of the ﬁctitious cases, it is reasonable to conclude that results are not just driven by chance.
For example, in the placebo experiment for the Netherlands, we proceed as if each country in the
donor pool introduced a compulsory ID-system in 2005. We then compute the estimated eﬀect
associated with each placebo run in order to have a distribution of estimated gaps with respect to
the countries in which no intervention took place. If the placebo experiment shows that the gap
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introduce an ID-system, we interpret that our analysis provides signiﬁcant evidence of the eﬀect
of the introduction of such a system.
Figure (2) reports such an experiment for the bank credit over deposit variable. The gray lines
represent the gap for each placebo experiment, that is the diﬀerence in the share of bank credit
to deposit between each country and its respective synthetic version. For example, the black and
red lines in the upper-left panel represent the estimated gap for the Netherlands and Romania,
which are reported on the same graph as if the date of the intervention is the same (2005) for both
countries, and the placebo group is consequently the same. Out of the possible controls, we identify
34 control states that never introduced an identiﬁcation system over the period under analysis. 8
INSERT Figure (2) here.
Overall, these results suggest a sharp and positive eﬀect for the Netherlands, Romania, Portugal
and Lithuania, a mild eﬀect for the United Arab Emirates, whereas the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant for
El Salvador, Cyprus, Chad, and Oman. In line with the BDM analysis, results (not reported, but
available upon request) are substantially analogous, when looking at the share of private credit to
GPD. The only exception is a stronger positive eﬀect for Cyprus.
5.4 Discussion
The evidence from these diﬀerent methods indicates that the introduction of an identiﬁcation
system has a slightly positive eﬀect on ﬁnancial access and intermediation. Some remarks, however,
are needed. We will ﬁrst discuss some of the econometric issues and then some other issues, which
may aﬀect the interpretation of our results.
Magnitude of beneﬁts: First of all, we cannot say anything about the magnitude of these beneﬁts
in relation to the cost of the introduction of an identiﬁcation system. As noted above, the cost of
the introduction of such a system is high, and merits further analysis in order to obtain insights
on the net beneﬁts. There are no international statistics on these costs, which is rather surprising
given the importance of these systems.
Omitted variable bias and the parameter of interest: The comparison of the identiﬁcation co-
eﬃcient across speciﬁcations suggests that countries with both a credit register and identiﬁcation
system tend to have higher levels of ﬁnancial intermediation and greater shares of private credit to
GDP. In fact the coeﬃcient is always smaller and signiﬁcant, whenever we introduce credit cover-
age variables, indicating a positive correlation between the two systems. It is important to notice
that these positive eﬀects are net of other constant country characteristics (e.g. legal origin), and
country institutional drivers already identiﬁed in the literature (e.g. rule of law).
8In the ﬁgures, we include only countries that do not have extreme pre-treatment measurement errors (i.e.,
countries with a small gap in the pre-treatment period).
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of a mandatory national identiﬁcation system and credit registers is rather intuitive. The eﬀect
of such a system particularly unfolds if there is an institution which can generate scale eﬀects
by using the national identiﬁer for its activity. In the case of credit bureaus this leads to a more
eﬃcient consolidation of information on borrowers, for example, improving ﬁnancial intermediation
in downstream banking and reducing costs of banking.
Comparison with voluntary ID systems: We cannot compare the beneﬁts of the introduction
of a compulsory identiﬁcation system with any voluntary ID system. For example, such a system
exists in Austria, Finland and France. However, we can clearly identify the eﬀect of the introduc-
tion of compulsory identiﬁcation system for the group of switchers introducing such a system (17
countries).
Classiﬁcation of the U.S. as not having a compulsory system: As stated the U.S. has not a
compulsory ID system. There is no law in the U.S. that mandates that persons must be issued an
ID card and a single identiﬁcation number. The SSN card does not contain a picture ID and must
latest be issued at the ﬁrst job as it is related to social security taxes. At a bank a person must
present SSN card as well as a driver’s license or passport for the reason that SSN does not show
the picture of the person. Capturing the additional document increases the costs of banking.
Re-classiﬁcation of the U.S.: Even if we would reclassify the U.S. and similar countries such as
Canada and Ireland as having a compulsory systems - this does would not aﬀect our results. This
holds for the Conley Taber’s estimator as long as the Anglo-Saxon countries are not switchers in
the period of the analysis. Moreover, the way we current classify them reduces the size of the eﬀect
of the introduction in BDM estimations, because we are using countries with the most eﬃcient
ﬁnancial markets as a control group. In summary, results are robust and suggest a slightly positive
eﬀect. However, we admit that further information on such systems should be sought to get a
complete picture about the costs and beneﬁts of diﬀerent identiﬁcation systems.
6 Conclusions
We present preliminary evidence on the interplay of credit reporting and identiﬁcation systems
on ﬁnancial access and intermediation. Although we used a number of robustness checks, our
results should not be over-interpreted. The evidence is only preliminary and can only be seen as
a ﬁrst step towards better understanding of unambiguous identiﬁcation of customers and access
to ﬁnance. We show that the positive impact of the introduction of a mandatory identiﬁcation
system exists independent from other factors that could potentially inﬂuence ﬁnancial access and
intermediation. The positive impact exists if there are institutions such as credit registers, which
indicates a stronger indirect eﬀect of mandatory identiﬁcation systems, which primarily unfolds
through credit reporting.
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work on information asymmetries and risk-mitigating mechanisms such as screening and monitor-
ing. Whereas the empirical literature acknowledges cumbersome documentation as an obstacle to
access to ﬁnance, it remains silent on the issue of national identiﬁcation systems.
By relying on a new international dataset, we used diﬀerent econometric techniques to account
for problems arising from diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analyses in our setting. One of technique adopted
allows us also to provide additional country-level evidence for a limited number of countries (Chad,
Cyprus, El Salvador, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Oman, Portugal, Romania, and the United
Arab Emirates). The selection of these countries was based on a data-driven procedure, as they
introduced the mandatory identiﬁcation systems during the middle of the observation period.
We acknowledge that many open questions remain for future research: For example, the estima-
tions revealed that the establishment of a national identiﬁcation system does not have pronounced
eﬀects in low-income countries. This merits further investigation. Possible explanations are that
FATF guidelines are not well implemented and/or identity cards are not widely distributed. Lim-
ited geographical outreach of traditional banking services also plays a role. Moreover, even a
roll-out of new cards in a developing country could have incomplete population coverage, as the
provision of cards might be a costly and lengthy process. Another reason could be the unchanged
demand for bank services, where the population might be too poor to aﬀord such services. Fur-
ther, informal sectors might play an important role, but there is a lack of international time series
information on the subject matter.
In addition, we currently face a number of limitations with regards to the information available
for further investigation of the eﬀects of identiﬁcation systems. For example, there are no time-series
on access to ﬁnance variables, other than those that we use. As noted, we also lack internationally
comparable data on the distribution of identity cards as well as whether countries have introduced
biometric cards. We regard this lack of information as a further ﬁeld of action by policy makers
and international institutions.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 031Table 1: FATF Members and FSRB Members (2010)
FATF Members Country
FATF Members Argentina,* Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong
Kong, China, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea,
South, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United
States
FSRB Members Country
Asia/Paciﬁc Group on Money Launder-
ing (APG)
Bangladesh, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, China, In-
dia, Japan, Korea, South, New Zealand, Singapore, United
States, Afghanistan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Fiji,
Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal,
Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa,
Sri Lanka, Taiwan, China, Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu and
Vietnam
Caribbean Financial Action Task
Force (CFATF)
El Salvador, Guyana, Jamaica, Antigua and Barbuda, Be-
lize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Suriname, Trinidad and To-
bago and Venezuela
Eurasian Group (EAG) China, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russia,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money
Laundering Group (ESAAMLG)
South Africa, Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauri-
tius, Mozambique, Namibia Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanza-
nia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laun-
dering in South America (GAFISUD)
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay
Council of Europe Committee of Experts
on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Launder-
ing Measures and the Financing of Terror-
ism (MONEYVAL)
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Lithuania, Montenegro,
Romania, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croa-
tia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latria,
Macedonia, FYR, Moldova, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia and Ukraine
Middle East and North Africa Financial Ac-
tion Task Force (MENAFATF)
Oman, United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Egypt, Jordan,
Kuweit, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Su-
dan, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen
Inter Governmental Action Group against
Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA)
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde,
Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia,
Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo
Notes: * Countries can be part of FATF and regional bodies, e.g. Argentina is member of FATF and of GAFISUD.
Countries not quoted herein are not part of FATF or any FSRB (e.g. Zimbabwe and Angola).
Source: Own compilation.
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Variable Description & Source
Bank credit_deposit Ratio of bank credit over bank deposits, expressed as a percentage. Source: World Bank.
Financial system_gdp Ratio of ﬁnancial system over GDP, expressed as a percentage. Source: World Bank.
Fixedlines The variable measure the number of ﬁxed lines. A ﬁxed line is an active line connecting the
subscriber’s terminal equipment to the public-switch telephone network. This include the
active number of analog ﬁxed telephone lines, ISDN channels, ﬁxed wireless, public payphones
and VoIP subscriptions. Source: ITU.
Gdp_deﬂator Inﬂation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deﬂator. The GDP
implicit deﬂator is the ratio of GDP in current local currency to GDP in constant local
currency. Source: World Development Indicators. Source: World Development Indicators.
Gni_pcap GNI per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP). PPP-GNI is Gross National Income
(GNI) converted to international dollars using PPP rates. Source: World Development
Indicators.
Identiﬁcation The variable indicates the existence of a compulsory identiﬁcation system between 2000 and
2010. It equals 1 in case there is a national compulsory identiﬁcation system, 0 otherwise.
Source: U.S. State Department, Privacy International and United Nations.
Income class A dummy variable that indicates the income class of each country (which might be either a
high income OECD country, high income non-OECD, upper middle country, low middle, or
a low Income country). Source: Djankov et al. 2007 and the CIA World Factbook 2008.
Legal origin A dummy variable that indicates the origin of each country’s company law or commercial
code, which may be of English, French, German, Scandinavian or Socialist origin. Source:
Djankov et al. 2007 and the CIA World Factbook 2008.
Overall score It is the average of 10 scored economic freedoms: business freedom, trade freedom, ﬁscal
freedom, government size, monetary freedom, investment freedom, ﬁnancial freedom, prop-
erty rights freedom from corruption, labor freedom (covers 2000-2010). Source: Heritage
Foundation.
Private coverage The variable indicates the extent of population covered by a private credit bureau between
2004 and 2008. It assumes value 0 if there is no population coverage, value 1 if at most
10% of the population is covered, value 2 if at most 25% is covered, value 3 if at most 50%
is covered, and value 4 is a share greater than 50% is covered. Source: World Bank Doing
Business.
Private credit_gdp Ratio of credit from deposit taking ﬁnancial institutions to the private sector in relation to
GDP, expressed as a percentage. Source: World Bank.
Private register The variable indicates the existence of a private credit bureau between 2000 and 2010. It
equals 1 in case a private credit bureau is operating, 0 otherwise Source: Own compilation
from public sources, World Bank.
Population Country population. Source: ILO.
Public coverage The variable indicates the extent of population covered by a public credit register bureau
between 2004 and 2008. It assumes value 0 if there is no population coverage, value 1 if at
most 10% of the population is covered, value 2 if at most 25% is covered, value 3 if at most
50% is covered, and value 4 is a share greater than 50% is covered. Source: World Bank
Doing Business.
Public register The variable indicates the existence of a public credit register between 2000 and 2010. It
equals 1 in case a public credit register is operating, 0 otherwise. Source: Own compilation
from public sources, World Bank.
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Variable Mean Std Between Std Within Min Max N
Bank credit_deposit 0.91 0.495 0.197 0.107 5.406 1464
Fixedlines 18.592 18.795 2.526 0.01 74.48 1528
Gdp deﬂator 9.845 19.747 20.45 -13.923 515.776 1495
Gni_pcap 10.197 11.96 2.13 0.2 65.05 1458
Identiﬁcation 0.609 0.473 0.125 0 1 1548
Population 0.039 0.142 0.004 0 1.337 1377
Private coverage 1.144 1.512 0.383 0 4 616
Private credit_gdp 0.446 0.41 0.116 0.001 2.698 1250
Private register 0.47 0.462 0.194 0 1 1532
Publi coverage 0.629 0.809 0.251 0 4 623
Public register 0.452 0.477 0.148 0 1 1534
Overall score 60.104 10.015 2.771 24.3 90 1308
Data source is reported in Tab (2)
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 031Table 5: ID-System: Country Sample
Summary: Sample of Countries No
Total number of countries in sample 172
Countries with compulsory identiﬁcation system 97
Countries without compulsory systems 58
Countries switching status (2000-2008) 17
Compulsory ID-System in 2000-2008 by Legal Origin
Legal Origin Never Introduced Already Introduced Introduced
English 32 20 7
French 13 54 6
German 4 9 2
Scandinavian 5 0 0
Socialist 4 14 2
Source: Own compilation.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 031Table 6: Estimation Results: BDM Ignoring Serial Correlation
In the ﬁrst-stage regression the dependent variable is regressed on country ﬁxed-eﬀects, year dum-
mies, and other covariates. In the second stage regression, the residuals from the ﬁrst-stage averaged
over two periods - before and after - are regressed on the policy variable (a dummy equal to one)
for the treated groups only.
Dep var Bank Credit/Deposit Private Credit/GDP
Second-stage regression
Identiﬁcation ( δ1) 0.013 0.100** 0.046** 0.015**
(0.104) (0.042) (0.019) (0.006)
First-stage regression
(a) (b) (a) (b)
Population -0.6439 -3.0321 0.6975 2.1874
(1.321) (3.085) (0.750) (1.440)
Fixedlines -0.0007 0.0016 0.0088*** 0.0061***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Gni_ pcap 0.0222*** 0.0307*** 0.0306*** 0.0389***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.003)
Gdp deﬂator -0.0007* 0.0021 0.0000 0.0006
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Private register 0.1463*** 0.0656 -0.0102 0.0195
(0.029) (0.058) (0.017) (0.026)
Public register -0.0730* 0.1437* -0.0067 0.0564
(0.040) (0.078) (0.026) (0.038)
Private coverage 0.0515*** 0.0183**
(0.015) (0.007)
Public coverage 0.0213 -0.0001
(0.025) (0.012)
Overall score 0.0131*** 0.0040*
(0.004) (0.002)
Constant 0.6960*** -0.2532 0.0414 -0.4444***
(0.058) (0.295) (0.034) (0.133)
ll 355.5378 385.6232 947.5975 676.1538
N 1263 453 1109 412
*p<0.10,** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Note: Robust standard errors in ().
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 031Figure 1: ADH Estimator: Bank Credit/Deposit
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 031Figure 2: Placebo ADH Estimator: Bank Credit/Deposit
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